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Abstract
This paper analyses optimal capital and labour income taxation for
households di¤erentiated by labour skill, income and wealth, under a bal-
anced government budget, over the business cycle. A model incorporating
capital-skill complementarity in production and di¤erential access to labour
and capital markets is developed to capture the cyclical characteristics of
the U.S. economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill pre-
mium) and wealth inequality. We nd that optimal taxes for middle-income
households are more volatile than the remaining taxes. Moreover, the gov-
ernment re-allocates the total tax burden in bad times so that the share of
total tax revenue paid by middle-income households rises. This share also
rises for low-income households but by signicantly less, while the tax share
for skilled households falls.
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1 Introduction
There is a considerable literature that aims to characterize the properties
of optimal capital and labour income tax policy over the business cycle.
This research is undertaken in models with and without market imperfec-
tions as well as with and without restrictions to the set of policy instruments
available to the government (see, e.g. the work reviewed in Mankiw et al.
(2009)). For example, in a representative-agent model with a frictionless
labour market, Chari et al. (1994) nd that the labour income tax should
vary little over the business cycle and remain a-cyclical, whereas capital in-
come taxes should uctuate around zero. Werning (2007) shows that the
optimal volatility of labour taxes for households of di¤erent ability should
also be very low. A further extension by Angelopoulos et al. (2015), in a
representative household business cycle model with state contingent debt,
capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill acquisition nds that op-
timal skilled and unskilled labour tax smoothing holds. In contrast, Arseneau
and Chugh (2012) nd that under search frictions in the labour market, the
optimal labour income tax becomes very volatile and counter-cyclical. Ad-
ditionally, Stockman (2001) shows that a balanced-budget restriction in a
representative-agent model implies that although labour income taxes are
still smoother than capital taxes, the volatility of labour taxes relative to
that of capital taxes increases.
However, the literature has not examined optimal capital and labour in-
come taxation over the business cycle under limited participation of house-
holds in asset and skilled labour markets. This is despite the empirical evi-
dence on increased wage inequality associated with capital-skill complemen-
tarities in production1 and the importance of "hand-to-mouth" consumers for
macroeconomic stabilisation policy.2 Moreover, the business cycle properties
of optimal income taxes when the government cannot issue debt to respond
to exogenous shocks have not yet been examined in this environment. This
restriction is particularly relevant in the post nancial crisis political environ-
ment which favours limiting the use of debt to respond to uctuations in most
advanced economies. In such a setting, the revenue requirements for govern-
ments that are faced with exogenous aggregate shocks need to be nanced
by unpleasant taxes. Thus, a pertinent question for policymaking becomes
how to use the tax rates to meet its spending requirements in response to
exogenous shocks over the business cycle.
1See, e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review of the
literature on wage inequality and the skill premium.
2See, e.g. the papers by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al.
(2007).
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In light of the above, we aim to analyse optimal capital and labour income
taxation over the business cycle when the government cannot issue debt to
respond to exogenous shocks in setup that captures the long-run and cyclical
characteristics of the U.S. economy and the empirical observations on wage
(skill premium) and wealth inequality. To achieve this, we develop a model
economy characterised by capital-skill complementarity in the production
sector, a labour market which is fragmented with respect to skill, and capital
market frictions that lead to the exclusion of a subset of the population from
holding assets.
Our model thus consists of three types of households, representing high,
middle and low income groups, as well as skilled and unskilled labour markets.
We assume that skilled households are college-educated. The other two types
of households, in contrast, are excluded from the skilled labour market due to
lack of college-level education and can thus only provide unskilled labour.3
Capital market frictions in the form of transaction costs associated with
nancial intermediation result in households which also di¤er with respect
to their participation in the asset markets. We assume that a subset of the
households do not have any savings and thus only earn labour income which
is totally consumed. We further assume that these households o¤er unskilled
labour services, so that the three types of households in the economy are
dened as, high income skilled agents who own assets and face the lowest
transactions costs, middle income unskilled agents who also own assets and
low income unskilled agents who do not have access to the asset markets.
In contrast to the representative agent optimal taxation literature of e.g.
Chari et al. (1994), Stockman (2001) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012), our
modeling emphasises the importance of household heterogeneity associated
with di¤erences in opportunities to participate in markets for labour and as-
sets. In capital markets, frictions lead to di¤erent returns and participation.
In labour markets, socio-economic barriers, in the form of limited access to
funding for training, family background and neighbourhood and other peer
e¤ects, exclude certain socio-economic groups from the skilled work. Com-
pared to the heterogeneous agent literature of optimal taxation assuming
unobserved innate productivity di¤erences (see e.g. the work reviewed and
analysed in Kocherlakota (2010)), our approach focuses on a quantitative
evaluation of the business cycle properties of capital and labour income taxes
for three key socio-economic groups.
We calibrate a version of the model with exogenous tax policy to the U.S.
quarterly data and nd that the model ts the key long-run stylized facts
3See, for example, Goldin and Katz (2008) for the importance of insu¢ cient growth in
college education in explaining wage inequality.
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as well as the main cyclical properties of the data, i.e. the skill premium is
e¤ectively a-cyclical and not volatile.4 We then characterize optimal policy
by allowing a Utilitarian government to choose capital and labour income tax
rates for di¤erent households over the business cycle to maximise aggregate
welfare, given its revenue requirements.
To decide how to set taxes over the business cycle, the government must
evaluate a key trade-o¤. On one hand, unfavourable income taxes, in the
form of higher levels, higher volatility and counter-cyclicality, imply higher
marginal social welfare losses when applied to the lower income groups. This
negative e¤ect is especially strong for hand-to-mouth households, since asset
market exclusions imply that they lack the means to smooth consumption
over time. At the same time, the tax revenue gains from counter-cyclical
and more volatile taxes also increase with the tax base to which they apply.
Therefore, the government has an incentive to keep the taxes that apply to
households with less income smoother and less counter cyclical. On the other
hand, unfavourable labour income taxes for skilled households propagate
more in the economy given the complementarity between capital and skill
labour. This creates a strong incentive for the government to keep the labour
tax for the skilled household smooth and pro-cyclical.
We nd that optimal labour taxes are less volatile than output and less
volatile than capital taxes, similar to Stockman (2001). Our main results
pertain to the comparisons of capital and labour income taxes between house-
holds with di¤erent income levels. Overall, we nd that optimal labour and
e¤ective tax rates for middle-income households are more volatile than the
remaining taxes. We also nd that the tax on skilled labour income is pro-
cyclical, whereas the labour income tax is a-cyclical for the middle and low
income households. Finally, e¤ective tax rates for the top two income groups
are counter-cyclical whereas they are again a-cyclical for the low income
households.
Given the above trade-o¤ for optimal tax policy, middle-income house-
holds are relatively less exposed to economic uctuations than hand-to-mouth
households. Moreover, their factor supply choices are relatively less criti-
cal for amplifying exogenous shocks than skilled households. The labour
tax to skilled households, in particular, is the least volatile income tax un-
der productivity shocks. The protection a¤orded by the optimal tax sys-
tem to skilled labour supply is greater under productivity shocks where the
role of skilled hours in counteracting aggregate productivity losses is more
important. Overall, due to exclusions in asset and labour markets, under
4See e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011) for similar exercises in model
evaluation with wage inequality and the skill premium.
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capital-skill complementarity, the importance that skilled workers enjoy in
production and the vulnerability of hand-to-mouth consumers to income uc-
tuations imply an incentive to change taxes least favourably for the middle
income group over the business cycle.
Our analysis shows that in bad times, associated with negative produc-
tivity shocks and increased expenditure requirements, the di¤erent tax rates
do not change proportionately. Therefore, there is a redistribution of the tax
burden between the three income groups in response to such negative shocks.
We quantify this redistribution by calculating the change in the share of the
total tax revenue paid by each of the three income groups. We nd that the
relative tax contributions paid by middle-income households rise, followed by
a signicantly smaller increase for low-income households, while the relative
tax share for skilled households falls.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model
structure. Sections 3 and 4 describe the cyclical properties of the model under
exogenous and optimal scal policy respectively. Finally, the conclusions are
presented in Section 5.
2 Model
We next develop a business cycle model to capture key features of an econ-
omy characterised by limited participation in labour and asset markets. We
rst consider a fragmented labour market, so that there are separate markets
for "skilled" and "unskilled" labour, dened as workers with and without col-
lege education. We assume that there are socio-economic barriers that do
not allow mobility between the two types of labour.5 This is motivated by
empirical evidence which suggests that in business cycle frequencies the share
of college educated population in the data has low volatility and is e¤ectively
uncorrelated with output. More specically, using the data in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), we nd that the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of the skilled population share, relative to that of output, is 0.27, while its
5When looking at longer horizons, it is natural to allow for mobility from unskilled
to skilled labour due to human capital investment and university education (see e.g. He
(2012) and Angelopoulos et al. (2017) for models incorporating the joint determination of
the relative skill supply and the skill premium). In such contexts, the microfoundations
that lead to socio-economic exclusion and/or social mobility are important for long-run
outcomes and transitional dynamics (see e.g. Matsuyama (2006) and Aghion and Howitt
(2009, ch. 6)). Here, focusing on business cycle frequencies, we take the barriers that lead
to the split in the labour force to skilled and unskilled workers as given.
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correlation with output is -0.18.6 These ndings suggest that the proportions
of skilled (college educated) and unskilled workers do not change signicantly
over the business cycle. This environment naturally leads to wage inequal-
ity. Following the skill premium literature (see e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005),
Goldin and Katz (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews), we as-
sume that the production process involves skilled and unskilled labour inputs
which have di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital and in partic-
ular that skilled labour complements capital relatively more than unskilled
labour.
We also allow for asset holding costs when participating in capital markets
(see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Benigno (2009)). These cap-
ture the outlays associated with nancial intermediation.7 Given inequalities
in asset ownership, and specically, evidence that suggests higher wealth for
skilled relative to unskilled workers, we distinguish these costs between skilled
and unskilled households.8 This is motivated, for instance, by assuming that
higher education and professional class imply higher nancial literacy, which
in turn reduces the reliance on nancial intermediation for investing in asset
markets (see, e.g., Bernheim and Garrett (2003) for evidence that nancial
literacy increases asset market participation). This leads to di¤erent asset
holdings across workers, and, in particular, we assume that a subset of the
population is excluded from the asset markets (see, e.g. Aghion and Howitt
(2009)) for capital market imperfections that may lead to limited market par-
ticipation and agent heterogeneity). Excluded or hand-to-mouth households
cannot smooth consumption and consume all their (labour) income (see e.g.
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al. (2007)).
The above assumptions lead to an economy with three types of house-
holds: (i) skilled, s, who save and provide skilled labour; (ii) unskilled, u,
who save and provide unskilled labour; and (iii) hand-to-mouth, h, who do
not save and provide unskilled labour.9 Given the previous discussion, the
composition of the population is assumed to be constant and exogenous. For
simplicity, we also assume that the total size of the population, N , is con-
6This is obtained using annual data for the share of college educated population mea-
sured in e¢ ciency units, 1963-2008, from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and GDP data from
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The cyclical component of the
series is obtained using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
7See Philippon (2014) on the importance of nancial intermediation over the 20th
century.
8Data from the 2010 U.S. Census, which will be discussed below in more detail, indicate
that the wealth of the population with at least a bachelor degree is two and half times
more than those without a bachelor degree.
9A similar population decomposition is considered in the analysis of UK policy reforms
in Angelopoulos et al. (2014).
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stant. The above implies thatN = Ns+Nu+Nh, where we dene ns = Ns=N ,
nu = Nu=N , and nh = 1   ns   nu. There are also N identical rms and a
government.
2.1 Production and rms
Each rm maximises its prots in perfectly competitive markets, by em-
ploying labour and capital inputs to produce output, Yt. The production
technology is characterised by capital-skill complementarity (see e.g. Goldin
and Katz (2008) for historical evidence on the empirical relevance of this
technology in the 20th century). In particular, the constant returns to scale
(CRS) production function is given by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) specication, similar to e.g. Krusell et al. (2000):10
Yt = At


h


kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'
+ (1  )

hfu;t
' 1'
(1)
where kft is the quantity of capital used by the rm, whereas h
f
s;t and h
f
u;t de-
note the quantities of skilled and unskilled labour respectively. In this speci-
cation, At > 0 is the level of total factor productivity (TFP); ';  < 1 are the
parameters determining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1= (1  ') is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and
unskilled labour, whereas 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labour; and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters.
Capital-skill complementarity is obtained if 1=(1  ) < 1=(1  ').
Following the literature, At is assumed to follow a stochastic exogenous
AR(1) process:
log (At+1) = (1  A) log (A) + A log (At) + "At (2)
where "At is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
able with zero mean and standard deviation given respectively by A.
Taking prices and policy variables as given, rms maximise prots:
t = Yt   ws;thfs;t   wu;thfu;t   rtKft (3)
subject to the technology constraint in (1). In equilibrium, prots are zero.
The optimality conditions for the rm are given in the Appendix.
10Recent studies in the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) literature which employ a
production function with di¤erent degrees of complementarity of capital with skilled and
unskilled labour include e.g. Lindquist (2004), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012).
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2.2 Households
Households, denoted with the subscript j = s; u; h, maximize expected life-
time utility:
Uj = E
1X
t=0
tu(Cj;t; lj;t) (4)
where E is denotes expectations; 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor;
Cj;t and lj;t are private consumption and leisure respectively at period t; and
u() is the utility function:
u(Cj;t; lj;t) =
h 
Cj;t + (1  ) lj;t
 1

i(1 )
1   (5)
where  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion; 0 <  < 1, with 1
1 
representing the elasticity of substitution of leisure for consumption; and
0 <  < 1 measures the share of consumption in utility.
A household of type j faces the following time constraint:
1 = lj;t + hj;t (6)
where hj;t is hours worked in period t. Additionally, skilled and unskilled
households, m = s; u, face the following budget constraint:
(1   lm;t)wm;thm;t + (1   km;t)rtKm;t = Cm;t + Im;t +  m (Km;t)2 (7)
while hand-to-mouth households face the constraint:
(1   lh;t)wu;thh;t = Ch;t (8)
where Im;t is investment in new capital, Km;t; wm;t is the wage rate; rt, is the
net return to capital; and  m > 0 measure the holding costs for capital.
The above budget constraints capture several key di¤erences between the
households populating the model. First, households di¤er in their labour
income, as there are di¤erent wage rates for skilled and unskilled households.
Second, the households also di¤er in their capital income, since they face
di¤erent holding costs. Skilled and unskilled households face nite holding
costs, modelled here as quadratic functions of the capital stocks, following
e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009). These di¤er between
households so that they can be distinguished with respect to their steady-
state holdings of wealth. Moreover, the hand-to-mouth households implicitly
face holding costs that are innite, so that they are excluded from the asset
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markets. Third, the households face di¤erent capital and labour income
taxes.
Finally, for m = s; u, the laws of motion for capital are:
Km;t+1 = (1  )Km;t + AetIm;t (9)
where, 0    1. The capital evolution equation allows for an exogenous
process, Aet , capturing an investment-specic technological change, which has
been shown to contribute to output uctuations (see e.g. Greenwood et al.
(2000)), as well as the changes in the skill premium (see e.g. Krusell et al.
(2000), Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)). The investment-specic
technological change, Aet , is assumed to follow a stochastic exogenous AR(1)
process:
log
 
Aet+1

= (1  Ae) log (Ae) + Ae log (Aet ) + "Aet (10)
where "Aet is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
able with zero mean and standard deviation given by Ae .
An increase in the e¢ ciency level of investment in capital, Ae favours
the productivity of skilled workers more than the productivity of unskilled
workers. Hence, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence that
points to skill-biased technical change and a rising skill premium over the
recent decades (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000);
also see Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews).
Each household m = s; u chooses a sequence of state-dependent actions
fCm;t; hm;t; Im;t; Km;t+1g1t=0, to maximise (4) subject to (6) ; (7) and (9),
by taking initial conditions, policy variables and prices as given. Similarly,
hand-to-mouth households, j = h, choose a sequence of state-dependent
actions fCh;t; hh;tg1t=0, to maximise (4) subject to (6) and (8), by taking
initial conditions, policy variables and prices as given. Exogenous processes
are independent of one another. The optimality conditions for the households
are given in the Appendix.
2.3 The government
The governments budget constraint is given by:
Gt = 
l
s;tnsws;thst + 
k
s;tnsrtKs;t + 
l
u;tnuwu;thu;t + 
k
u;tnurtKu;t+
+ lh;tnhwu;thh;t
(11)
where, Gt is average government expenditure per household.
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The government budget in (11) is constrained to be balanced in each
period, hence the government cannot issue debt to nance Gt.11 In Section
3 below, as part of the model calibration, we consider a policy regime where
the tax rates are set exogenously. To avoid public nancing issues, we assume
that Gt is the residual instrument in equation (11).12 In contrast, when we
examine optimal policy in Section 4, the government chooses all tax rates to
maximise aggregate welfare under the constraint that (11) is satised period
by period and Gt follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
log (Gt+1) = (1  G) log (G) + G log (Gt) + "Gt (12)
where "Gt  iidN(0; 2G). Since we focus on the revenue side of the budget
constraint for optimal policy, we assume that Gt is wasteful. Thus, inno-
vations to Gt act as exogenous shocks to the requirement for tax revenue
that needs to be generated (see e.g. Chari et al. (1994), Stockman (2001)
and Arseneau and Chugh (2012) for a similar approach regarding Gt in the
optimal taxation literature).
2.4 Market clearing conditions
The labour and capital market clearing conditions are given by:
hfs = nshs (13)
hfu = nuhu + nhhh (14)
Kt = nsKs;t + nuKu;t. (15)
The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = Gt + nsCs;t + nuCu;t + nhCh;t + nsIs;t + nuIu;t+
+ns s (Ks;t)
2 + nu u (Ku;t)
2.
(16)
11Implicitly, the amount of government debt and its repayment are a xed quantity,
which is reected in the calibration of the level of G below, in that we allow the level of G in
the steady-state to be determined by tax revenue collected by the government. Stockman
(2001) considers optimal capital and labour taxes under a balanced-budget restriction,
in a setup with a representative household, by xing government debt and requiring the
government to generate revenue for debt repayments, in addition to nancing government
spending. Here we focus only on the latter objective, as recent experience has shown that
interest payments on debt can depend critically on the type of debt held by the government
and on nancial market conditions not modelled here.
12A non-distorting policy instrument which only serves to balance the government bud-
get under exogenous policy is commonly used in the analysis of optimal taxation. For
instance, Farhi (2010) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012) use a lump-sum transfer for this
purpose. In our setup, household heterogeneity implies that lump-sum transfers to house-
holds can a¤ect allocations. Hence, we let government spending to be residually deter-
mined when studying exogenous policy.
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3 Exogenous policy
Prior to studying optimal tax policy, we calibrate the model to examine
whether its predictions regarding rst and second moments of the endogenous
variables are consistent with the data. This analysis is undertaken when the
model is driven by exogenous and empirically relevant technology processes
and labour and capital income tax rate processes.
Given stationary stochastic processes for the tax rates f ls;t;  lu;t;  lh;t;  ks;t;
 ku;tg1t=1 and for technology fAt; Aetg1t=1, initial values for the exogenous pro-
cesses and initial levels for assets,Ks;0 andKu;0, the DCE system of equations
is characterized by stochastic processes for allocations fCs;t; Cu;t; Ch;t; hs;t;
hu;t; hh;t; Ks;t+1; Ku;t+1; Is;t; Iu;t, Gtg1t=0, and for prices fws;t; wu;t; rtg1t=0 such
that: (i) households maximize their welfare and rms their prots, taking
policy and prices as given; (ii) the government budget constraint is satised
in each time period and (iii) all markets clear.
3.1 Business cycle statistics
We aim for the exogenous-policy model to replicate the long-run great ra-
tios and key labour and asset market characteristics as well as explaining
the cyclical volatilities and correlations with output of key variables in the
economy. In Table 1 we report the data volatilities and correlations with out-
put from existing studies for variables which correspond to key endogenous
variables in our model. These are taken directly from the results reported
in Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011) and refer to quarterly data for
the period 1979-2002 and 1979-2003 respectively.13
As can be seen in Table 1, these studies document some interesting re-
sults regarding the labour market data. In particular, they point out that
the skill premium is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output and smoother than
output in business cycle frequencies. Moreover, the cyclical properties of
13To obtain labour supply per skill group at a quarterly frequency, these studies disag-
gregate the labour force into skilled and unskilled by taking into account the years spent
in education (i.e. skilled workers are those with 14 or more years of schooling). This is
based on the assumption that college-educated workers are primarily employed in occupa-
tions that require high skills and have higher returns (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
and references therein). Acemoglu and Autor (2011) present annual data for the relative
supply of college-educated versus high-school graduates and for the wage premium paid
to college educated workers. Although we use the quarterly data for our business cycle
analysis, the second moments of the skill premium, using the annual data and the clas-
sication in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), gives similar results. In particular, the cyclical
relative volatility and correlation of the skill premium with output are given by 0.49 and
-0.13 respectively.
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the labour supply of skilled and unskilled workers do not di¤er qualitatively,
both having a positive correlation with output, while being less volatile than
output.14 The ndings regarding consumption and investment are similar to
those commonly obtained in other macroeconomic research.
Table 1: Business cycle statistics of main endogenous variables
Xi Y C I
ws
wu
hs hub(X i; Y ) 1 0.83 0.76-0.91 0.09-0.19 0.69 0.73b(X i) 0.013-0.014 0.011-0.012 0.037-0.063 0.006-0.013 0.010 0.012
Sources: Data reported in Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011).
3.2 Calibration
The parameters of the model are calibrated either based directly on data
(including existing econometric evidence) or by ensuring that the steady-
state and cyclical properties of key endogenous variables are consistent with
the data. The calibrated parameters are summarised in Tables 2, 3A and 3B.
Table 2 reports the parameters referring to functional forms and constraints
associated with the householdsand rmsproblems. Table 3A reports the
parameters for the exogenous processes required to solve and simulate the
model under exogenous policy. In contrast, to solve and simulate the model
under optimal policy requires the two productivity processes from Table 3A
plus an additional process for government spending whose parameters are
reported in Table 3B.
3.2.1 Population shares
We assume that the population breakdown in our model economy is given
as ns = 0:4, nu = 0:4, nh = 0:2.15 The share of skilled households is roughly
consistent with data from the 2010 U.S. Census, which indicates that 43%
of the population has a college degree and that the percentage of households
without any assets is 18.7%.16 It also broadly coheres with the data in
14The statistics for labour supply in Table 1 are reported in Pourpourides (2011) and
the underlying data source is Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008). Labour supply data in
Lindquist (2004) and output data by US National Income and Product Accounts also
generate labour statistics for skilled labour that are comparable with those for unskilled
labour, with marginally higher output correlation for skilled relative to unskilled labour.
We thank Matthew Lindquist for his help with the labour supply data.
15We will discuss below that a particular advantage of the 40=40=20 percent split in
population is that it allows us to approximate the e¤ective income tax rate which applies
to each group by using the Piketty and Saez (2007) income tax data per income quintal.
16This information is obtained from Table 4 of the U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of Income
and Program Participation, 2008 Panel, Wave 7, updated in July 12, 2013.
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Acemoglu and Autor (2011), which implies that the average share of the
labour force with a college degree is about 45%. Finally, the split of unskilled
households into hand-to-mouth and those who can access the asset market,
ties in with empirical evidence from Traum and Yang (2010) and Cogan et
al. (2010), who estimate the share of the hand-to-mouth population for the
U.S. at 18% and 26.5% respectively.
Table 2: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0    1 0.022 depreciation rate of capital calibration
0 <  < 1 0.990 time discount factor calibration
1
1  1.429 consumption to leisure elasticity calibration
0 <  < 1 0.415 weight attached to consumption in utility calibration
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion assumption
1
1  0.669 capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity assumption
1
1 ' 1.669 capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity assumption
0 <  < 1 0.515 composite input share of output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.800 capital equipment share of composite input calibration
 s> 0 1 e 5 asset holding cost for skilled agents calibration
 u> 0 2:5 e 5 asset holding cost for unskilled agents calibration
3.2.2 Tax-spending policy
We use two data sources for income taxation. We have rst constructed
annual data on e¤ective average capital and labour income tax rates from
ECFIN using Martinez-Mongay (2000) approach and extending the original
dataset.17 However, this dataset does not provide information on the pro-
gressivity of the tax system. Therefore, we also use income tax data from
the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset, which reports annual data on income
tax rates per income group (in quintals) for the period 1966-2001. We use
this data to obtain a measure of the progressivity of the tax system. In par-
ticular, we construct three income tax rates, the rst for the lowest quintal,
the second as the average for the two middle quintals, and the third as the
average for the two top quintals.
We then work as follows. Given that in practice a large part of capital
income (e.g. rm prots and income from asset holdings) is taxed separately
from household income, at a xed tax rate, we assume for the purposes of
calibration that  ks;t = 
k
u;t. We then normalise the three income tax rates
17In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for e¤ective average labour and capital
taxes respectively for 19702011. The exact data series required for this construction are
described in Martinez-Mongay (2000).
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constructed using the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset so that their weighted
average (using the relative population weights) equals the average of the e¤ec-
tive labour income tax burden using the ECFIN data and Martinez-Mongay
(2000) approach. Working like this we are able to broadly calibrate the model
to tax rates that capture both the progressivity of household income taxation
and the distribution of the tax burden between capital and labour income.
Regarding the labour income taxes, we assume that for j = s; u; h:
log
 
 lj;t+1

=
 
1  lj

log
 
 lj

+ lj log
 
 lj;t

+ "
 lj
t (17)
where "
 lj
t  Niid(0;  lj). We use the time-series of the normalised, income
tax rates from the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset, constructed as described
above as proxies for  lj;t, j = h; u; s, respectively.
18 Therefore, we set the
constant terms in the AR processes described above for,  lj , j = h; u; s, to
be equal to the data averages for the normalised tax rate for the respective
income quintals, i.e. for 0 20, 20 60 and 60 100. Moreover, we calculate
lj and 
l
j by estimating the AR(1) processes in (17), using the cyclical
component of the respective tax series in the data. All tax and spending
series are logged and HP-ltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600 before
estimating the required second moments.
Regarding the capital income taxes, we assume that for  ks;t = 
k
u;t   kt :
log
 
 kt+1

=
 
1  k log   k+ k log   kt + "kt (18)
where "
k
t  Niid(0; k). We use the time-series for e¤ective capital tax
rates, constructed following Martinez-Mongay (2000) approach, and working
as above for the labour income tax rates we estimate k and k .
The government spending series is obtained using quarterly data from the
BEA for the period 1979 to 2002.19 Following the same procedure as with
the tax rates, we calculate G and G by estimating the AR(1) processes in
(12), using the cyclical component of the public spending series.
3.2.3 Production, asset and labour markets
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and be-
tween unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have been estimated
18These tax rates refer to average tax rates by income groups. To obtain quarterly series
from the annual data, we follow the interpolation method in Litterman (1983). We use as
an indicator variable the quarterly time-series of labour income tax rates from Arseneau
and Chugh (2012).
19This series refers to government consumption expenditures and gross investment as it
is reported in NIPA Table 1.1.5.
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by Krusell et al. (2000). We use their estimates, so that ' = 0:401 and
 =  0:495. The remaining parameters in the production function are cali-
brated to ensure that the steady-state predictions of the model in asset and
labour markets are consistent with the data (following e.g. Lindquist (2004),
He and Liu (2008), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012)). The income shares
 and  are calibrated to obtain a skill premium of 1:659 and a labour share
of income of about 69%. In particular, the target value for the skill premium
is obtained from the dataset of Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) using quar-
terly U.S. data for the period 1979-2003.20 The share of labour income in
GDP is obtained from BEA data on personal income for the period 1970-
2011.21 The calibrated parameters in the production function are generally
very similar to those estimated or calibrated in the literature.
The depreciation rate of capital is set as  = 0:022 to obtain an investment
to output ratio of about 15%. This is within the range of Krusell et al. (2000),
Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011).
We set the asset holding cost parameters as  s = 1  e 5 and  u =
2:5  e 5. There are two targets for these parameters. The rst is that the
total asset holdings for skilled households in the deterministic steady-state is
2:5 times higher than for unskilled households. This ensures that the models
steady-state matches data from the U.S. Census22 which indicates that the
wealth of the population with at least a bachelor degree is two and half times
more than those without a bachelor degree. The second target is that the
model with exogenous policy produces a quarterly capital to output ratio
equal to 6:55 in the steady-state. This is consistent with an annual capital
to output ratio of about 1:64, obtained using BEA annual data on capital
stocks from 1979 to 201123.
3.2.4 Utility function
The time discount factor,  = 0:99, is calibrated to match an asset return
net of depreciation and taxes equal to 1%. The weight of consumption in
utility,  = 0:415 is set so that the investment to consumption ratio from
the model is close to the data average of 24%.24 Moreover,  = 0:30 so that
20Using the data in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) gives a similar value for the average
skill premium, namely 1:6.
21The data are obtained from the BEA, Table 2.1, Personal Income and Its Disposition.
22The information is obtained using Table 1 from the U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of
Income and Program Participation, 2008 Panel, Wave 7, last modied July 12, 2013.
23The capital stock is calculated using the following data from BEA: NIPA Table 1.1
(line 3 plus line 21 minus line 7) and Tables 7.1A (line 30) and Table 7.1B (line 38).
24The data series used for investment and consumption are obtained from the BEA,
NIPA Table 1.1.5 for the period 1979-2011.
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the households devote about 33% of their time to work. For the base results
below, we set the value for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,  = 2,
equal to the mid-point of the most likely range reported in Gandelman and
Hernández-Murillo (2013). We then further investigate the role of a higher
 for optimal policy below. Note that, as is common in optimal taxation
analyses (see e.g. Mankiw et al. (2009)), we assume common preferences
across households. This ensures that di¤erences in optimal income tax rates
across households reect heterogeneity in opportunity and not in preferences.
Table 3A: Stochastic processes
Parameter Value Denition Source
A 0.006 std. dev. of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coef. of TFP assumption
A 1.000 mean of TFP set
Ae 0.008 std. dev. of inv.-specic tech. change calibration
Ae 0.975 AR(1) coef. of inv.-specic tech. change calibration
Ae 1.000 mean of inv.-specic tech. change set
 ls 0.002 std. dev. of labour income tax, skilled data
 ls 0.870 AR(1) coef. of labour income tax, skilled data
 ls 0.260 mean of labour income tax, skilled data
 lu 0.002 std. dev. of labour income tax, unskilled data
 lu 0.900 AR(1) coef. of labour income tax, unskilled data
 lu 0.210 mean of labour income tax, unskilled data
 lh 0.002 std. dev. of labour income tax, hand-to-mouth data
 lh 0.940 AR(1) coef. of labour income tax, hand-to-mouth data
 lh 0.170 mean of labour income tax, hand-to-mouth data
k 0.006 std. dev. of capital income tax data
k 0.900 AR(1) coef. of capital income tax data
 k 0.310 mean of capital income tax data
3.2.5 Technology
The constant terms in the processes for TFP and investment-specic techno-
logical change are normalized to unity (i.e. A = 1 and Ae = 1 respectively).
We calibrate the autocorrelation and standard deviation parameters for the
process of investment-specic technological change (Ae and Ae) to match
the correlation of investment with output and the standard deviation of in-
vestment in the data as presented in Table 1. The autocorrelation parameter
of TFP is set equal to 0:95, following Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides
(2011), while A is calibrated to match the volatility of output observed in
the data (see Table 1).
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Table 3B: Additional stochastic processes (optimal policy)
Parameter Value Denition Source
G 0.009 std. dev. of public spending data
G 0.770 AR(1) coef. of public spending data
G 0.142 mean of public spending calibration
3.3 Solution and results
The deterministic steady-state solution of the DCE system for key variables
is compared with their corresponding data averages in Table 4. To study
dynamics, we compute a second-order approximation of the equilibrium con-
ditions around the deterministic steady-state, by implementing the pertur-
bation methods in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). We simulate time paths
under shocks to total factor productivity, investment-specic technological
change and income tax realizations, that are obtained from the distributions
specied above (see Table 3A). We conduct 10,000 simulations of 96 periods
to match the number of observations in the data used by the studies in Table
1, initialised from the steady-state in Table 4. For each simulation, we HP-
lter the logged series and then compute the required moments and report
the means of these moments across the simulations in Table 5.
Table 4: Steady-state of the exogenous policy model
Variable Model Data Variable Model Data
K
Y
6.550 6.550 hs 0.353 0.359
I
Y
0.141 0.159 hu 0.322 -
C
Y
0.604 0.659 hh 0.351 -
rnet 0.010 0.010 ehu 0.331 0.348
ws
wu
1.659 1.659 wh
Y
0.698 0.686
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the predictions of the model
with respect to both the steady-state and business cycle properties of the
series cohere well with the data.25 Starting with the steady-state, Table 4
25Note that the data sources for the series in Table 4 include: (i) BEA, NIPA Table
1.1.5 for output, investment and consumption; (ii) BEA, NIPA Table 1.1 (line 3 plus line
21 minus line 7) and Tables 7.1A (line 30) and Table 7.1B (line 38) for the capital stock;
(iii) Lindquist (2004) for hours worked (obtained by dividing hours worked per week by
7*16 hours available for work and leisure); (iv) World Bank for the real rate of return; (v)
BEA, NIPA Table 2.1 for labours share in income; and (vi) U.S. data from Castro and
Coen-Pirani (2008) for the skill premium. Comparable averages are obtained using the
dataset in Lindquist (2004), for those variables that are similar in both studies.
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shows that the model predictions are quantitatively similar to the long-run
averages in the data.
Regarding the labour markets, the utility function was calibrated so that
households work on average about one third of their available time. The
model predicts work hours for skilled and unskilled workers that are similar
to the data. Note that ehu is average work hours by households providing
unskilled labour in our model. Table 4 also shows that the labours share of
income in the model, wsnshs+wunuhu+wunhhh
Y
= 0:698 is very close to the value
(i.e. 0.686) obtained from the BEA Table 2.1 for 1979-2002.
The work-time allocations also imply Frisch (or -constant) labour supply
elasticities of 1:39 for skilled, 1:45 for unskilled and 1:27 for hand-to-mouth
workers, which are generally consistent with the literature (see e.g. Chetty et
al. (2011), and Keane and Rogerson (2012)). These Frisch elasticities cohere
with two di¤erent sources of empirical evidence regarding labour supply de-
cisions of heterogeneous workers. In particular, Domeij and Flodden (2006)
nd that credit-constrained households have a more inelastic labour supply,
while Blau and Khan (2007) and Kimball and Shapiro (2008) nd that work-
ers with a college degree have lower labour supply elasticity compared with
workers with some or no college education. Note that the di¤erences between
the labour supply elasticities of the di¤erent types of households predicted
by the model are not due to assumed di¤erences in preferences. Instead,
they are driven by the di¤erent opportunities that the households face in the
labour and asset markets as well as the production structure of the economy.
Regarding the asset markets, the transaction costs are calibrated to match
wealth inequality and capital as a share of GDP, and indeed the model pre-
dicts Ks=Ku = 2:5. Moreover, government spending is residually determined
given the data averages for the tax rates and the models steady-state pre-
dicts a value for total tax revenue as a share of GDP of about 25%, which is
consistent with the U.S. data (see e.g. summary statistics and data sources
in Hindriks and Myles (2013, ch. 4)).
Turning to the business cycle statistics in Table 5, the overall t is com-
parable to the data reported in Table 1 and to the results from existing
research on business cycle models with wage inequality under capital-skill
complementarity (see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)). The
model matches the key stylised facts regarding the skill premium in the data,
i.e. it is e¤ectively not correlated with output and its volatility is less than
that of output. In addition, the model predictions regarding the second mo-
ments of hours worked are generally consistent with the data and with the
predictions from the dynamic general equilibrium models in Lindquist (2004)
and Pourpourides (2011). Overall, we conclude that the models predictions
regarding the key endogenous variables are empirically relevant.
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Table 5: Business cycle statistics of main endogenous variables (model)
Xi Y C I
ws
wu
hs hu hhb(X i; Y ) 1 0.91 0.84 0.18 0.94 0.72 0.98b(X i) 0.014 0.007 0.051 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.002
4 Optimal distribution of tax burden
We now discard the exogenous processes for the income tax rates in (17)
and (18) and instead assume that the processes for these tax rates are opti-
mally chosen by a government that seeks to maximise a Utilitarian objective
function under commitment. Government spending follows the exogenous
process in (12) with the parameters given in Table 3B.
4.1 The problem of the government
The government chooses state-dependent tax rates to maximise aggregate
welfare subject to the optimality conditions of households and rms and
the government budget constraint.26 The government can choose di¤erent
tax rates for each di¤erent source of income, implying that it can choose an
e¤ective income tax rate for each household, i.e. for each income group in the
economy. Di¤erent responses between the taxes after exogenous technology
and revenue requirement shocks imply a redistribution of the tax burden
over the business cycle. The government has to decide whether these tax
rates should have the same volatility and comovement with output over the
business cycle and, if not, how to set these cyclical properties for each tax
rate.
We examine the problem of a government that has Utilitarian preferences.
Thus, its objective function is given by the expected lifetime utility of the
weighted average of the welfare of the three types of households:
U g = E
X
j=s;u;h
"
nj
1X
t=0
tu(Cj;t; lj;t)
#
(19)
26In Angelopoulos et al. (2015), we examine second-best policy for a Ramsey planner
that has access to a complete set of tax instruments and state-contingent debt, under
capital-skill complementarity. However, that analysis focuses on a representative house-
hold, so that we do not address issues pertaining to income inequality between heteroge-
neous households and di¤erences in the e¤ective income taxation between households.
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where the weights attached to each type are equal to the population share
of that type, nj (see e.g. Mankiw et al. (2009) on the common use of Utili-
tarian social preferences for optimal taxation analyses). We assume that the
government has access to a commitment technology and chooses processes
for f ls;t;  lu;t;  lh;t; Cs;t; Cu;t; Ch;t; hs;t; hu;t; hh;t; Ks;t+1; Ku;t+1; Is;t; Iu;t; ws;t; wu;t;
rtg1t=0 and f ks;t;  ku;tg1t=127 that satisfy the budget constraints (7), (8), (11),
market clearing (13)-(15), and optimality conditions (A1)-(A8) in the Ap-
pendix.28 As is common in optimal policy problems, we assume that the
rst-order conditions from this problem are necessary and su¢ cient, and all
allocations are interior (see e.g. Arseneau and Chugh (2012)). To preserve
space, we only discuss the rst-order conditions for the policy instruments
(income taxes). The equilibrium conditions for the policy instruments en-
capsulate key incentives that the Utilitarian government needs to consider
when setting taxes optimally over the business cycle. These are summarised
here and then further discussed in the following sub-sections, when analysing
how the government resolves the trade-o¤ implied by setting its policy instru-
ments. In particular, as we shall see, di¤erences between optimal income tax
rates arise from a quantitative evaluation of the costs and benets associated
with income taxes and a comparison of those costs and benets between the
taxes.
4.1.1 Optimality conditions for taxes
The rst-order conditions for  ls;t and 
k
s;t are given by:
@U g
@ ls;t
= gbct nshs;tws;t   bcst hs;tws;t   lsst Ucs (t)ws;t = 0 (20)
@U g
@ ks;t
= gbct nsKs;trt   bcst Ks;trt   kst 1Ucs (t) rt = 0 (21)
where lsst , 
ks
t 1, 
bcs
t and 
gbc
t refer to the Lagrange multipliers attached to
the skilled households FOCs for hours worked and capital, the households
budget constraint and the government budget constraint respectively.29 The
27Note that, as is typically the case in problems with optimal capital taxation, the
government is not allowed to choose the capital tax for period 0.
28Note that the constraints do not include a present value implementability constraint,
which is the typical approach in Ramsey problems with debt; instead, the government
budget constraint is imposed in each period.
29Note that the rst-order conditions can be obtained by dropping any of the budget
constraints or the aggregate resource constraint, given that these are linearly combined.
To facilitate presentation, we present the FOCs for the government here assuming that
the aggregate resource constraint is dropped, since this allows for a symmetric treatment
of the arguments entering these conditions.
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rst-order condition for the choice of taxes dictate that these should be cho-
sen so that the net marginal social benets equals the marginal social costs.
For instance, regarding  ls;t, the net marginal benets, MB
s, arising from an
increase in this tax are given by: gbct nshs;tws;t bcst hs;tws;t. The rst term in
MBs captures the increase in the tax revenue collected by the government.
This works to increase social welfare by leading to a reduction in the total
revenue requirements of the government and thus the need to use the remain-
ing distorting policy instruments. The increase in tax revenue is transformed
into units of social welfare via the marginal social valuation of an additional
unit of tax revenue, i.e. gbct . The second term inMB
s captures the decrease
in the skilled households income, which works to reduce household and thus
social welfare. This is again transformed into social welfare terms by the mar-
ginal social valuation of relaxing the skilled households budget constraint,
i.e. bcst . The marginal costs, MC
s, in turn are given by: lsst Ucs (t)ws;t and
capture the distortions in labour supply, associated with the fall in the mar-
ginal net returns to work time. These are rst transformed into household
utility terms by Ucs and second into units of social welfare by the relevant
shadow social price of the distortion, i.e. lsst . Similar arguments apply to
the costs and benets associated with  ks;t, where now the costs are associated
with the distortion of the investment decision of the skilled household.
The rst-order conditions for the remaining income tax rates are given
by:
@U g
@ lu;t
= gbct nuhu;twu;t   bcut hu;twu;t   lsut Ucu (t)wu;t = 0 (22)
@U g
@ ku;t
= gbct nuKu;trt   bcut Ku;trt   kut 1Ucu (t) rt = 0 (23)
@U g
@ lh;t
= gbct nhhh;twu;t   bcht hh;twu;t   lsht Uch (t)wu;t = 0 (24)
where lsut , 
ku
t 1, and 
bcu
t refer to the Lagrange multipliers attached to the
unskilled households FOCs for hours worked and capital and the households
budget constraint respectively; and lsht , and 
bch
t refer to the Lagrange mul-
tipliers attached the hand-to-mouth FOC for hours worked, and the hand-to-
mouth budget constraint respectively. The interpretation of these rst-order
conditions follows the same reasoning as for the conditions for the labour and
capital income taxes applied to the skilled household.
The above conditions for the income tax rates demonstrate that there are
two main channels for the impact of income taxes on social welfare. First,
they increase total revenue while decreasing disposable income of the house-
holds. Second, they distort the households factor supply decisions. The
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magnitude of these channels may di¤er between households, as well as be-
tween the taxes, given heterogeneity in opportunities, so that a quantitative
evaluation is required to determine optimal taxes. In particular, the net
marginal benet described above is expected to be increasing with the in-
come level, because higher income implies both a higher tax base (and thus
higher increase in the tax revenue) and a lower social welfare cost by reduc-
ing income and consumption for the wealthier households. The latter e¤ect
is driven by the concavity of the utility functions at the household and ag-
gregate level. On the other hand, as explained below in more detail, the
negative implications of the distortions in factor supplies for aggregate pro-
ductivity are stronger for taxes on skilled households, followed by unskilled
and hand-to-mouth.
4.1.2 Trade-o¤ for optimal policy
The literature on optimal taxation suggests that capital taxes should be
smaller on average and more volatile over the business cycle, compared with
labour income taxes (see e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2012)). Optimal policy in our framework requires the government to decide
not only how to set capital versus labour income taxes over the business cycle,
but also how to distinguish capital and labour income taxes for each factor
supply and (implicitly) income level. In particular, the government needs to
decide if all labour income taxes should have similar stochastic properties,
in terms of volatility and cyclicality, or, if not, how they should di¤er across
households; and similarly for the two capital income taxes. The barriers and
transaction costs that limit participation in asset and labour markets as well
as the production structure in our model economy create di¤erent channels
for the stochastic properties of tax rates to a¤ect aggregate welfare.
To decide how to set taxes over the business cycle, the government must
evaluate a key trade-o¤, which follows from the previous sub-section. On one
hand, unfavourable income taxes, in the form of higher level, volatility and
counter-cyclicality, imply higher marginal social welfare losses when applied
to the lower income/consumption groups. This negative e¤ect is particularly
strong for hand-to-mouth households, since asset market exclusions imply
that they lack the means to smooth consumption over time. At the same
time, the tax revenue gains from counter-cyclical and more volatile taxes
increase with the size of the tax base to which they apply. Therefore, the
government has an incentive, for both reasons, to keep the taxes that apply
to lower income, lower wealth households smoother and less counter-cyclical.
On the other hand, unfavourable taxes directed at the skilled households
propagate more in the economy given that the factor supply choices of these
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households have a greater e¤ect on capital accumulation. This is due to
the complementarity between capital and skill and because the high income
skilled households supply more capital than either of the unskilled house-
holds. Thus, taxes applied to skilled households imply higher distortions at
the aggregate level than the other taxes. This creates an incentive for the
government to smooth taxes for the skilled household and to set their taxes to
be the least counter-cyclical. By extension, taxes to the middle income group
of unskilled workers are less distorting than the skilled but more distorting
than taxes to hand-to-mouth workers whose factor supply choices a¤ect the
propagation mechanism the least.
The analysis of the results below elaborates on this trade-o¤. In sub-
sections 4.4 - 4.7, we further investigate the strength of the channels em-
bedded in the model and relate these to this trade-o¤ work by considering
appropriate model variants and changes in related parameters.
4.1.3 Solution
To numerically solve for the outcomes under optimal policy, we follow e.g.
Arseneau and Chugh (2012) in that we rst compute the deterministic steady-
state under optimal policy and then approximate the equilibrium conditions
under optimal policy around the deterministic steady-state of these condi-
tions.30 Compared with Arseneau and Chugh (2012), who use a rst-order
approximation in a representative agent context, it is useful in our hetero-
geneous household setup that includes hand-to-mouth households to employ
a second-order approximation. This is because the e¤ects of the stochastic
environment on households depend on their ability to smooth consumption,
thus a¤ecting di¤erently households with di¤erential access to asset markets.
Moreover, in our setup, since there is no government debt, to solve for
the deterministic steady-state we shut down shocks and drop time subscripts
in the rst-order equations arising from the governments problem (19), and
then solve the non-linear system of equations using numerical methods. The
asymptotic non-stochastic equilibrium is independent of initial conditions
and can thus be solved for independently of the dynamic paths.31 For this
30Hence, as also discussed in e.g. Arseneau and Chugh (2012), this implies the auxil-
iary assumption that when calculating asymptotic policy dynamics the initial state is the
asymptotic steady state associated with optimal policy.
31This property of the model is particularly useful in our setup, because the existence
of two types of households with access to the asset market would imply two present value
implementability constraints if the government could issue debt as in the unrestricted
Ramsey problem. In turn, this implies that solving for the optimal dynamic paths from
period 0 to the steady state is a complex problem.
22
property of the model, the transaction costs in capital ownership at the house-
hold level are also important. In particular, the presence of transaction costs
means that the two Euler equations remain di¤erent in the non-stochastic
steady-state even if  ks = 
k
u , in turn implying that the asymptotic equilibrium
can be solved without requiring additional restrictions (e.g. in the form of
initial conditions). Instead, if the transaction cost parameters are set to zero,
the two Euler equations in Appendix A collapse to one in the deterministic
steady-state if  ks = 
k
u and thus the latter cannot be obtained without addi-
tional restrictions. Thus, the setup does not rule out  ks = 
k
u as a potential
optimal policy outcome given the computational strategy adopted.32
4.2 Optimal policy in the long-run
The optimal tax rates in the non-stochastic steady-state are presented in
Table 6.
Table 6: Optimal policy in the steady-state
 ls 
l
u 
l
h 
k
s 
k
u 
e
s 
e
u
Steady-state 0.510 0.116 0.042 0.005 0.001 0.371 0.074
As can be seen, optimal capital income taxes are near zero, consistent with
the literature since Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). They are not exactly
zero, as in the frictionless neoclassical model, because of the intermediation
costs in holding capital, which create a resource implication for the aggregate
economy that the government needs to take into account when choosing taxes
optimally.33 The capital income tax for skilled households is higher than
that for unskilled, however, quantitatively, optimal long-run capital taxes
are small.
The small capital income taxes imply that to generate the additional tax
revenue required, the government needs to employ non-zero labour income
taxes, which distort the labour supply decisions of the households. Optimal
labour income taxation is progressive in the long-run and ranges from about
50% for skilled households to about 5% for hand-to-mouth households. The
e¤ective income taxes per income group, calculated as total tax revenue col-
lected per household in the group over the total income of the household,
suggest that the skilled (higher income group) would optimally pay about
37% of the their total income in taxes, whereas the unskilled households
7.4% and the hand-to-mouth 4.2%.
32In fact, note that ks = 
k
u was assumed in order to solve the model under exogenous
policy.
33See, for example, Guo and Lansing (1999) and Judd (1997) for previous examples of
non-zero capital taxes in the long-run that arise because of frictions in the capital market.
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The results in Table 6 imply that the government increases aggregate wel-
fare in this framework, when using distorting taxes, by redistributing some
income from higher to lower income households. This result reects the opti-
mal resolution of the following trade-o¤. On one hand, since the Utilitarian
government cares equally about all households and the social welfare func-
tion is concave with respect to the consumption of the households, aggregate
welfare gains can be achieved by increasing consumption of lower income
households and decreasing consumption of higher income households. On
the other hand, however, since this redistribution requires the use of distort-
ing income taxes, there is an e¢ ciency loss that reduces average income and
hence aggregate welfare for all households.
Total income taxation is progressive in the steady-state under the market
exclusions assumed in this model. It should be noted that if these market
exclusions were relaxed, for instance by allowing unskilled workers to educate
and become skilled, optimal policy would also need to take the skill-creation
incentives into account, which could have important implications for optimal
tax progressivity. However, focusing on business cycle frequencies, where
the proportions of skilled and unskilled workers do not vary signicantly, as
noted earlier, we assume away such movements between these skill groups.
4.3 Optimal taxes over the business cycle
We next compute uctuations around the deterministic optimal steady-state
by simulating the optimal-policy equilibrium under the exogenous processes
to TFP, investment-specic technological change and government spending
described in Section 3.34 We present the results for the optimal properties
of the tax system for the benchmark model under all exogenous processes in
Table 7 and under one process at a time in Table 8.
4.3.1 Volatility and cyclicality of taxes: base results
Consistent with the results in e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001),
the capital income taxes are more volatile over the business cycle, compared
with labour income taxes. This is because capital taxes apply to a tax base
that is pre-determined when the exogenous shocks are realised in each period,
which creates e¢ ciency incentives for a higher response of the capital income
34To calculate the required statistics for optimal policy, we conduct simulations under
shocks to the exogenous processes, which are initialised from the steady-state (in this case
of the economy under optimal policy), obtain the required statistics and calculate their
mean value across the simulations. We conduct 10,000 simulations of 96 periods.
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taxes.35 The relative magnitude between capital and labour tax standard de-
viations in Table 7 is comparable to the results reported in Stockman (2001)
under a balanced budget restriction.36 Moreover, and again consistent with
the literature, capital taxes uctuate around zero over time, as the condence
intervals in Table 7 indicate. The condence intervals for the labour income
taxes are also non-trivial and imply that 95% of the time labour income taxes
uctuate between about 2 for ( ls) and 4 (for 
l
u) percentage points.
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Table 7: Optimal tax policy for all shocks
(X i) CI(Xi)
(Xi)
(Y )
(X i;t; X i;t 1) (X i; Y ) CI((Xi; Y ))
 ls 0.510 0.501, 0.520 0.358 0.903 0.631 0.493, 0.738
 lu 0.116 0.096, 0.135 0.723 0.938 0.149 -0.053, 0.340
 lh 0.042 0.024, 0.060 0.664 0.950 -0.197 -0.382, 0.004
 ks 0.005 -0.061, 0.071 2.459 0.780 -0.776 -0.845, -0.682
 ku 0.001 -0.075, 0.077 2.825 0.630 -0.677 -0.773, -0.551
 es 0.371 0.359, 0.383 0.453 0.659 -0.698 -0.788, -0.579
 eu 0.074 0.050, 0.099 0.905 0.587 -0.686 -0.779, -0.563
 eh 0.042 0.024, 0.060 0.664 0.950 -0.197 -0.382, 0.004
Note: the condence intervals, CI, are at the 95% level here and in the tables below.
The main results in Table 7 pertain to the di¤erences in the volatility
between the capital taxes and between the labour income taxes as well as
between the e¤ective income taxes that apply to di¤erent households and
income levels. Regarding capital taxes, the rate levied on the unskilled
households is more volatile than the rate on the skilled households. This
relative di¤erence is even greater when comparing the volatility of labour
income taxes for unskilled (middle-income) and skilled households, as  lu is
twice more volatile than  ls. The labour income tax rate to hand-to-mouth
households is more volatile than the labour income tax to skilled households
35See also Fahri (2010) and Gervais and Mennuni (2015) on optimal capital taxation.
36This is also conrmed when we calculate results under higher risk aversion results in
later sections. For instance, for a very similar high degree of risk aversion (see our results
for  = 8 below) both our model and Stockman (2001) under a balanced budget constraint
predict that optimally the ratio of standard deviations of capital to labour income taxes
is about 10. In contrast, note that without the balanced budget restriction, Stockman
(2001) nds that such ratios exceed 100.
37The comparison with previous results in the literature here focused on qualitative
properties and relative magnitudes. Quantitatively, the results in Table 7 imply di¤erent
levels of standard deviations for capital and labour taxes compared with e.g. Stockman
(2001). As discussed earlier, the models di¤er in many dimensions. Moreover, the sto-
chastic environment captured by the simulation exercise is also di¤erent. Therefore, it is
di¢ cult to compare the e¤ect of exogenous stochasticity on the endogenous quantities and
thus on the magnitude of the response required by the government.
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but less volatile than the labour income tax to unskilled households that can
smooth consumption. Moreover, the government chooses counter-cyclical
capital income taxation and sets e¤ectively a-cyclical labour income taxes
for hand-to-mouth and unskilled households, and pro-cyclical labour income
taxes for skilled workers.38
The properties of the e¤ective income taxes are important because they
encapsulate the overall e¤ect of taxation on household income. The outcome
of the e¤ects on capital and labour income taxes is such that the e¤ective
income tax rate applying to the middle-income group is twice more volatile
than the e¤ective income tax rate applying to high income households and
about 50% more volatile compared to the e¤ective income tax rate applying
to hand-to-mouth (note that this e¤ective rate is equal to  lh). Moreover,
e¤ective income taxes are counter-cyclical for the skilled and unskilled groups
and a-cyclical for the hand-to-mouth households. Hence, although in terms of
labour income the tax to the skilled, high-income households is pro-cyclical,
the counter-cyclicality of the capital income taxes implies that, overall, these
households face counter-cyclical e¤ective income taxes.
The quantitative resolution of the trade-o¤ faced by the policy maker
when deciding how to distribute the distortions reected by the higher volatil-
ity and counter-cyclicality of the tax rates over the business cycle leads to the
optimal income taxes reported in Table 7. On one hand, tax distortions have
a larger impact on hand-to-mouth households, since they have lower income
and are not able to smooth shocks over time. There is thus an incentive
to minimise the impact of policy for this type of household. On the other
hand, tax-induced distortions to skilled households have the strongest prop-
agation e¤ects in the economy, given the complementarity of skilled hours
with equipment capital. Therefore, there is also an incentive to minimise
distortions to the choices of skilled households, since such distortions act to
amplify external shocks.
As a result, the government nds it optimal to respond to the public
nance implications of technology and expenditure shocks by setting taxes
to the middle income group of unskilled households (with savings) to be the
least smooth. For the high income group, it is the tax to skilled labour sup-
ply is the least volatile of all taxes in the economy, highlighting the key role
played by skilled labour in this model. On the other hand, counter-cyclicality
of e¤ective income taxation is monotonic with income, since the lower income
households face the higher marginal utility losses from an increase in income
taxation in bad times. For the higher income households, however, the gov-
38Note that the condence intervals for the correlation coe¢ cients were calculated using
the Fisher (1915) transformation.
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ernment chooses to generate this counter-cyclicality with respect to e¤ective
income taxation by making their capital taxation strongly counter-cyclical.
In turn, the strong counter-cyclicality of capital income taxation implies that
labour income taxation for the households who own the capital stock needs to
be set in a less counter-cyclical fashion, to compensate them for their capital
income losses.
The trade-o¤ that the government faces in setting taxes for the di¤erent
households will be further analysed in the next sub-section, when we look at
the e¤ects of each shock in isolation. This also leads us to address directly
the question of how the government optimally redistributes the tax burden
between the income groups in bad times. Following this analysis, to further
elaborate on the workings of the key channels underpinning the trade-o¤
discussed above, we will also investigate the importance of skill heterogeneity,
capital-skill complementarity and severity of limited consumption smoothing.
4.3.2 Optimal responses to productivity and spending shocks
We next evaluate how the government optimally changes the tax rates in
the short- and medium-run by examining the impulse responses (IRs) of
the optimal tax rates after a temporary, output-reducing standard deviation
shock to each of the exogenous processes. These are plotted in Figure 1
as deviations (in levels) from the steady-state. Moreover, in Figure 2, we
plot the responses of the e¤ective income tax rates implied by the capital
and labour income tax movement in Figure 1. To complement the impulse
response analysis, Table 8 presents the optimal properties of the tax system
under separate sources of economic uctuations.
Productivity shocks Figure 1 shows that in response to negative shocks
to A and Ae, the labour taxes are optimally reduced in the short-run, to
stimulate labour supply and support the income of the households, while
capital taxes are increased to make up for the loss in tax revenue. As in
Stockman (2001), the dynamic response of the capital taxes displays a more
gradual adjustment to the steady-state, instead of a very short-lived spike
after the shock, which is typically associated with optimal capital taxation
with debt. Given that the government cannot use debt to absorb the revenue
implications of quick reductions to capital taxes, the latter return to their
steady-state values more slowly.
[Figures 1 and 2 here]
The labour taxes increase above their pre-shock levels in the medium-run
before returning to the steady-state. The dynamic patterns are generally
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symmetric for the respective taxes for all households. However, as seen in
Table 8, the relative standard deviation of  ls is lower and its correlation with
the technology shocks is the most strongly positive. Both characteristics
capture the incentives of the government to use this tax in the least distorting
way over the business cycle. As pointed out earlier, skilled labour supply
works more as an amplication mechanism in response to exogenous shocks,
given the stronger complementarity it has with capital. For e¢ ciency reasons,
the capital taxes are more volatile than labour taxes and skilled labour supply
is supported by the least volatile and most pro-cyclical of the taxes.
Table 8: Optimal tax policy under individual shocks
 ls 
l
u 
l
h 
k
s 
k
u 
e
s 
e
u 
e
h
A shock
(Xi)
(Y )
0.326 0.558 0.519 2.147 2.186 0.357 0.636 0.519
(X i; Y ) 0.749 0.293 -0.143* -0.937 -0.926 -0.959 -0.991 -0.143*
(X i; A) 0.894 0.523 0.110 -0.993 -0.990 -0.996 -0.933 0.110
Ae shock
(Xi)
(Y )
0.532 1.191 1.426 3.404 3.447 0.659 1.383 1.426
(X i; Y ) 0.206 -0.324 -0.402 -0.426 -0.481 -0.253 -0.635 -0.402
(X i; A
e) 0.789 0.363 0.299 -0.805 -0.530 -0.588 -0.286 0.299
G shock
(Xi)
(Y )
1.000 1.500 2.500 26.25 51.75 6.500 18.00 2.500
(X i; Y ) -0.645 -0.922 -0.174* 0.228 0.577 0.201 0.549 -0.174*
(X i; G) -0.981 -0.775 0.721 0.747 0.892 0.689 0.887 0.721
* indicates that the 95% condence interval for the correlation coe¢ cient includes zero.
Note that the special treatment of skilled labour supply is especially
pronounced under investment-specic shocks, which a¤ect capital directly.
Thus, the need to use skilled labour to counteract these negative productiv-
ity e¤ects is stronger. As can be seen in Table 8, the relative volatility of  ls
is signicantly smaller than the remaining taxes in this case. Note that this
is the only tax that is pro-cyclical and also is the most strongly correlated
with the investment specic process.
The overall income implications of the responses of capital and labour
taxes are summarised by the responses of the e¤ective income taxes, plotted
in Figure 2. The optimal responses of the e¤ective income taxes after exoge-
nous negative productivity shocks imply that there is a short-run reduction
in the rate for hand-to-mouth households, whereas the e¤ective tax rate on
the remaining households is increased to meet the nancing requirements of
the government. These dynamic patterns capture the equity incentives of the
government and, in particular, the social benets by supporting the income
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of the poorest households, since a marginal decrease of income for the hand-
to-mouth households carries a higher social cost. As seen in Figure 1, the
increase in  es and 
e
u are driven by increases in the capital taxes, as labour
income taxes for households with asset holdings decrease in the short-run,
following negative productivity shocks.
However, note that under investment-specic shocks the hand-to-mouth
tax is more volatile than the remaining e¤ective taxes and has comparable
counter-cyclicality. Under more neutral productivity shocks, there are sig-
nicant di¤erences in counter cyclicality in favour of hand-to-mouth, even
though the volatility of  lh is comparable to that of 
e
s and 
e
u. Therefore, al-
though some protection is a¤orded to the poorer households under negative
productivity shocks, this cover is limited. The reason is that such shocks
have direct negative aggregate e¤ects and the tax system needs to respond
to the aggregate productivity losses.
Spending shocks The responses of the taxes are not the same under scal
expenditure shocks. In particular, as can be seen in the third row of Figure 1,
the government increases capital taxes as well as the labour tax rate to hand-
to-mouth households to increase tax revenue in response to increased scal
spending. Moreover, it decreases the labour income taxes to the remaining
households in the short-run but  ls and 
l
u are increased above the pre-shock
levels in later periods, and in fact the increase is faster compared with the
increase in these taxes in the medium-rum following the negative produc-
tivity shocks. The e¤ective tax rates in Figure 2 display a more symmetric
response across households in this case, as these tax rates follow more similar
dynamic patterns for all households. These patterns are consistent with the
correlations between the various income taxes and the scal spending shock
in Table 8.
Compared with negative technology shocks, which imply a drop in pro-
ductivity and thus to returns to labour and capital, positive scal spending
shocks do not directly a¤ect productivity and thus do not directly change
the income of the households. Hence, in choosing the taxes, the government
does not need to address a productivity shock that has aggregate as well
as redistributive implications on its own, but rather seeks to nd a way to
minimise the e¢ ciency and equity implications that are created directly by
the requirement to nance spending policy shocks. E¢ ciency considerations
imply a stronger reaction of capital relative to labour taxes (as explained ear-
lier) and this stronger reaction is pronounced here, relative to the responses
after negative productivity shocks. This is because the negative productivity
shocks act as an adverse shock to capital accumulation in the rst place.
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Thus, creating an incentive for the government to support capital accumula-
tion, which works in the opposite direction from the incentive to tax capital in
the short-run for e¢ ciency purposes. Accordingly, under government spend-
ing shocks, the di¤erence in the volatility of labour and capital taxes is more
pronounced. In addition, e¢ ciency requires that the increase in capital taxes
is higher proportionately for the investors who face the higher transaction
costs, since it is less e¢ cient at the aggregate level for them to hold assets.
Finally, e¢ ciency considerations imply that the skilled labour supply needs
to be supported. Hence, creating an incentive to treat more favorably labour
income taxation for skilled workers.
At the same time, equity considerations imply an incentive to keep di¤er-
ences between the changes in e¤ective taxation across households relatively
small. This implies that given the big increases in capital income taxes, the
labour income taxes for the households with assets are reduced in the short-
run, and the labour income tax for hand-to-mouth households is increased.
As capital income taxes return to their steady-state value, the labour income
taxes for households with assets are increased. However, note that again
the increase in the e¤ective tax to hand-to-mouth households is smaller pro-
portionately compared with the increase in e¤ective taxes to the remaining
households. Indeed,  lh is the least volatile of the e¤ective taxes, although its
correlation with the shock is comparable in magnitude.
4.3.3 The re-distribution of the relative tax burden in bad times
The previous analysis rst shows that, as the economy uctuates over time, a
Utilitarian government would choose tax rates that are more volatile and less
pro-cyclical for the middle income households, relative to the other household
types. This implies that, in business cycle frequencies, the second moments
of the tax rates are set least favorably for this income group. We examine
next the redistribution of the relative tax burden between the three income
groups in response to negative shocks associated with lower productivity and
increased expenditure requirements. We can identify the direction of this
redistribution and quantify it by calculating the change in the share of the
total tax revenue paid by each of the three income groups. This is shown in
Figure 3 and Table 9 for each of the three shocks examined in the previous
sub-section.
[Figure 3 here]
As can be seen in Figure 3, following negative shocks, the contribution
of tax revenue to total tax revenue is reduced for the group of high-income,
skilled households and increased for that of middle-income, unskilled house-
holds, for all types of shocks. Regarding the group of hand-to-mouth, low
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income households, their relative contribution is initially reduced and then
increased following negative productivity shocks, while it is increased follow-
ing increased government spending shocks.
Table 9: Distribution of the tax burden
skilled unskilled hand-to-mouth
shock sum of the change in shares
A -0.2485 0.1890 0.0595
Ae -0.2675 0.1953 0.0723
G -0.0556 0.0517 0.0039
discounted sum of the change in shares
A -0.1672 0.1321 0.0351
Ae -0.1500 0.1155 0.0345
G -0.0329 0.0298 0.0031
In Table 9 above, we calculate the sum of the deviations of the relative
tax revenue contributions from the steady-state ratio over time. The results
conrm that the share of total tax revenue paid by the middle-income house-
holds is increased by most, followed by a rise in the share for hand-to-mouth
that is about half of that for the unskilled, while the relative tax burden falls
for the skilled households. The results are similar across the three types of
shocks. As Table 9 shows, these results are robust to calculating discounted
sums (second part of the Table).
4.4 Importance of skill heterogeneity and capital-skill
complementarity
We next further investigate the importance of labour market heterogeneity
and capital-skill complementarity in relation to the main results in Table
7. We rst consider a version of the model where the production function
is a standard Cobb-Douglas form with capital and two types of labour in-
put, identied by exogenous productivity parameters that apply to skilled
and unskilled workers.39 These parameters are calibrated so that the model
generates the same steady-state skill premium as in the base model. The re-
maining parameters are calibrated following the relevant, where appropriate,
steps described in Section 3, to provide a steady-state that is e¤ectively the
same for the comparable aggregate quantities. We then obtain optimal taxes
39Hence labour input is a weighted average of the labour hours of skilled and unskilled
labour, where skilled and unskilled are di¤erentiated by exogenous labour productivity
parameters.
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and their statistics over the business cycle, working as above, and report the
results in the upper half of Table 10.
Changing the production function reduces the strength of the link be-
tween skilled labour and capital, since the relationship between di¤erent
types of labour and capital is symmetric in the production function. How-
ever, this change does not eliminate the relative importance of skilled hours
for production. This is because the higher productivity of the labour in-
put of the skilled worker implies that this input has a stronger e¤ect on the
marginal product of capital in the economy. Therefore, the new production
function reduces but does not eliminate the strength of the propagation ef-
fects associated with skilled labour and the importance of this for optimal
taxation is seen in the upper half of Table 10. In particular, the gap between
the volatility of the taxes applying to the skilled worker and the unskilled
workers is clearly reduced, compared with the results in Table 7, although it
is not totally eliminated. In terms of e¤ective tax rates, the middle-income
unskilled households still face the most volatile tax, but the skilled house-
holds now face a clearly more counter-cyclical tax than the other households,
and the second most volatile e¤ective tax. Hence, certain elements of the
protection a¤orded to skilled workers have been reduced.
To further investigate the importance of the privileged position of skilled
workers in production, we take the previous experiment one step further and
next eliminate di¤erences in labour productivity. In particular, we examine
optimal policy results in a version of the base model without labour market
heterogeneity and without capital-skill complementarity, by assuming that
all types of households o¤er identical labour services so that there is a single
wage rate. We also employ a Cobb-Douglas production function with one
type of capital and one type of labour as inputs. Therefore, the only dimen-
sion in which the households di¤er is in terms of their participation in the
capital market. The results for the optimal taxes and their statistics over the
business cycle, working as above, are reported in the lower half of Table 10.
This experiment allows us to conrm the importance of labour market
exclusions for the results obtained earlier under capital-skill complementarity.
As can be seen,  ls is now the most volatile of the labour income taxes, since
the high income households do not enjoy a privileged position in the labour
market. Their labour input is comparable to that of the remaining households
in terms of its implications for aggregate productivity and the propagation
of productivity shocks. Moreover, the volatility of income taxation is now
increasing with the wealth of the households, similar to the counter-cyclicality
results. In particular, note that while in terms of e¤ective taxation, counter-
cyclicality is increasing with income both in Table 7 and in Table 10, it is only
when the labour supply of the three households has the same productivity
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that the volatility of e¤ective income taxation increases with income.40 In
terms of the trade-o¤ that the government faces, only one side of this is
relevant here. In particular, the need to protect the income of the less well-
o¤ households in the face of exogenous uctuations which gives rise to the
monotonic results summarised in the lower half of Table 10.
Table 10: Optimal tax policy without capital-skill complementarity
(X i) CI(Xi)
(Xi)
(Y )
(X i;t; X i;t 1) (X i; Y ) CI((Xi; Y ))
Cobb-Douglas case with wage inequality
 ls 0.493 0.483, 0.503 0.185 0.894 0.623 0.481, 0.731
 lu 0.194 0.181, 0.207 0.241 0.922 0.246 0.048, 0.425
 lh 0.118 0.103, 0.133 0.274 0.915 0.141 -0.061, 0.332
 ks 0.010 -0.094, 0.114 1.970 0.297 -0.500 -0.637, -0.333
 ku 0.003 -0.122, 0.128 2.356 0.089 -0.237 -0.417, -0.038
 es 0.327 0.295, 0.359 0.604 0.203 -0.460 -0.605, -0.286
 eu 0.149 0.106, 0.192 0.807 0.080 -0.186 -0.373, 0.015
 eh 0.118 0.103, 0.133 0.274 0.915 0.141 -0.061, 0.332
Cobb-Douglas case without wage inequality
 ls 0.366 0.355, 0.378 0.331 0.900 0.527 0.365, 0.658
 lu 0.300 0.293, 0.308 0.213 0.923 0.250 0.052, 0.429
 lh 0.252 0.241, 0.263 0.309 0.912 0.159 -0.042, 0.349
 ks 0.005 -0.051, 0.062 1.612 0.669 -0.619 -0.729, -0.477
 ku 0.004 -0.087, 0.095 2.607 0.139 -0.398 -0.555, -0.215
 es 0.201 0.180, 0.223 0.618 0.558 -0.577 -0.697, -0.426
 eu 0.229 0.208, 0.250 0.601 0.100 -0.371 -0.532, -0.184
 eh 0.252 0.241, 0.263 0.309 0.912 0.159 -0.042, 0.349
4.5 Importance of risk-aversion
The risk aversion parameter  was not calibrated to hit a target in Section
3.3.4, but instead was set to a commonly employed value in macroeconomic
models. The extent of risk aversion characterising householdspreferences
may, however, matter for optimal policy over the business cycle. This is
because it reects the extent to which uctuations in consumption and leisure
a¤ect welfare directly.41 This can be relevant in our setup, since hand-to-
mouth households are particularly exposed to uctuations in income. We
40As with the results in Table 7, given the strong counter-cyclicality of capital income
taxes, labour income taxes for households who own assets need to be set less counter-
cyclically, to compensate them for the income loss sustained by the increase in capital
taxation in bad times.
41Analyses on optimal taxes over the business cycle generally consider the importance
of higher values of risk aversion (see e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001)).
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therefore present in Table 11 results for optimal taxes when  = 8.42
Table 11: Optimal tax policy with higher RRA (all shocks)
(X i) CI(Xi)
(Xi)
(Y )
(X i;t; X i;t 1) (X i; Y ) CI((Xi; Y ))
 ls 0.607 0.596, 0.617 0.466 0.916 0.721 0.608, 0.805
 lu 0.052 0.042, 0.063 0.474 0.950 0.160 -0.042, 0.350
 lh -0.097 -0.111, -0.084 0.603 0.939 0.055 -0.147, 0.253
 ks 0.005 -0.106, 0.116 4.888 0.238 -0.398 -0.554, -0.215
 ku -0.0003 -0.140, 0.140 6.164 0.163 -0.444 -0.592, -0.267
 es 0.458 0.433, 0.483 1.095 0.012 -0.130 -0.322, 0.072
 eu 0.029 -0.002, 0.061 1.388 0.115 -0.407 -0.561, -0.224
 eh -0.097 -0.111, -0.084 0.603 0.939 0.055 -0.147, 0.253
Given the higher costs attached to income uctuations particularly for
hand-to-mouth households, this calibration implies that these households
experience optimally the least volatile e¤ective income taxes, which are also
a-cyclical. Moreover, the di¤erence between volatilities of the labour income
tax rates for skilled and unskilled households that have access to savings
is reduced. However, the di¤erence in the volatilities of capital taxes is
increased, so that the overall di¤erence in the relative standard deviation of
 es and 
e
u does not change signicantly.
4.6 Importance of capital holding costs
The costs associated with holding assets in this setup distinguish the two
types of households in the asset markets and allow the model to be calibrated
to replicate observed asset market inequality. As explained in previous sec-
tions, if these costs are equal, then the Euler equations can be distinguished
in the steady-state only if the capital taxes di¤er. To quantitatively evaluate
the importance of reducing the distance in asset market inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers, we next consider an experiment where we re-
duce the asset holding cost parameter for the unskilled households by 50%.
The results are summarised in Table 12. As can be seen, this change a¤ects
the volatility attached to the two capital taxes in the expected way, i.e. it
increases the standard deviation of  ks relative to 
k
u , compared with the base
42Note that the higher risk aversion parameter implies that the model under exogenous
policy predicts lower volatilities for consumption and labour supplies, compared with the
data, while the correlation of consumption and the labour supplies with output are much
higher compared to the data. In other words, it worsens the overall t of the model
relative to the benchmark case under  = 2 presented in Section 3.4. Hence, although not
calibrated to hit a specic target, the value of  = 2 employed for the benchmark results
is consistent with empirically relevant cyclical properties for the model.
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results in Table 7, because the e¢ ciency advantages of allocating the more
distorting tax to unskilled capital income, as opposed to skilled, are signif-
icantly reduced. Other than this, however, the main results in Table 7 are
not a¤ected.
Table 12: Optimal tax policy, with lower  u
(X i) CI(Xi)
(Xi)
(Y )
(X i;t; X i;t 1) (X i; Y ) CI((Xi; Y ))
 ls 0.484 0.477, 0.492 0.283 0.908 0.574 0.424, 0.695
 lu 0.146 0.127, 0.165 0.710 0.923 0.321 0.128, 0.490
 lh 0.044 0.027, 0.061 0.645 0.947 -0.163 -0.352, 0.039
 ks 0.004 -0.076, 0.084 2.964 0.398 -0.641 -0.746, -0.506
 ku 0.001 -0.072, 0.073 2.688 0.776 -0.690 -0.782, -0.568
 es 0.379 0.365, 0.393 0.514 0.218 -0.506 -0.641, -0.340
 eu 0.081 0.053, 0.108 1.022 0.699 -0.669 -0.766, -0.541
 eh 0.044 0.027, 0.061 0.645 0.947 -0.163 -0.352, 0.039
4.7 Importance of government preferences
In our analysis we focused on the choices of a Utilitarian government that
cares equally about all households in the economy. As we have seen, such a
government in this setup would choose a tax system with higher progressivity
in the steady-state compared to the actual data. In this section we consider
instead the choices of a government that weighs the households in the social
welfare function in such a way that the implied optimal e¤ective taxes for the
three income groups are the same with those in the exogenous policy equilib-
rium. We calibrated the weights in the social welfare function following this
approach and obtained a weight attached to the skilled households of 0.568,
a weight to the unskilled households with assets of 0.262 and a weight to
hand-to-mouth households of 0.1. These weights imply that the policymaker
is biased in favour of high-income, skilled households, and against the lower
income households. The results for the choices of this policymaker over the
business cycle are summarised in Table 13.
Given that the government choices now incorporate a preference bias in
favour of the skilled workers that was pinned down by targeting the e¤ective
tax rates, it is not surprising that the volatility of  eu relative to 
e
s is even
higher compared with the Utilitarian case in Table 7. Consistent with this,  eu
is also more counter-cyclical relative to  es . On the other hand, the properties
of  lh are not as much a¤ected. Given that the importance of this group in
generating tax revenue is small, it seems that there is no need for big changes
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when this group receives a lower weight in the social welfare function.
Table 13: Non-Utilitarian tax policy
(X i) CI(Xi)
(Xi)
(Y )
(X i;t; X i;t 1) (X i; Y ) CI((Xi; Y ))
 ls 0.404 0.391, 0.417 0.471 0.907 0.514 0.349, 0.648
 lu 0.343 0.330, 0.356 0.478 0.915 0.392 0.207, 0.549
 lh 0.170 0.154, 0.186 0.610 0.944 -0.154 -0.344, 0.048
 ks 0.003 -0.093, 0.099 3.603 0.325 -0.427 -0.578, -0.248
 ku 0.004 -0.022, 0.232 8.559 0.090 -0.359 -0.522, -0.171
 es 0.278 0.250, 0.306 1.051 0.153 -0.262 -0.439, -0.064
 eu 0.240 0.174, 0.305 2.441 0.043 -0.352 -0.516, -0.163
 eh 0.170 0.154, 0.186 0.610 0.944 -0.154 -0.344, 0.048
We can nally see in Table 13 that the di¤erence in the volatility of
 eu relative to 
e
s is now due exclusively to the capital income taxes, as the
labour income taxes for these two groups have more similar properties. For
the Utilitarian case in Table 7, the government cares more about the skilled
workers relative to the unskilled indirectly, because of the key role that skilled
labour has in production and thus is propagation of shocks and aggregate
outcomes. This role works via skilled labour supply, which is why, in Table
7, it is the  lu relative to 
l
s relationship where most of the action in tax
heterogeneity takes place. On the other hand, under the preference bias in
Table 13, the government cares more about skilled versus unskilled workers
directly, via the social welfare function. Hence the emphasis on supporting
skilled labour supply for its benets to the aggregate economy is reduced,
and instead it is the total income e¤ects of taxation (as captured by changes
in  eu and 
e
s ) that are targeted directly by the government.
5 Conclusions
This paper analysed optimal taxes over the business cycle for households
di¤erentiated by unequal access to labour and asset markets. In particular,
we assumed that a subset of households provided skilled labour services,
whereas the rest worked as unskilled. Moreover, participation premia in the
asset markets varied in such a way that a subset of the unskilled households
was excluded from investing in the capital stock.
The model was shown to capture the empirical regularities of macroeco-
nomic variables over the business cycle and was consistent with key features
of the labour markets and wealth ownership that we considered. Our analy-
sis considered the problem of a government that chose income tax rates to
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maximise aggregate welfare. We found that optimal taxes for middle-income
households were more volatile than the remaining taxes. In addition, in bad
times, the share of total tax revenue paid by middle-income households rose,
followed by a signicantly smaller increase for low-income households, while
the relative tax share for skilled households fell.
The exclusions in asset and labour markets under capital-skill complemen-
tarity implied that the importance that skilled workers enjoyed in production
and the vulnerability of hand-to-mouth consumers to income uctuations
were such that unfavourable changes in taxation to the middle income group
were generally the least harmful to aggregate welfare over the business cycle.
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Appendix: FOCs for households and rms
Skilled households
The rst-order conditions of skilled households with respect to their choice
variables are:
Hours worked
Ucs (t)
 
1   ls;t

ws;t + Uhs (t) = 0 (A1)
Capital

n
EtUcs (t+ 1)
h 
1   ks;t+1

rt+1 +
(1 )
Aet+1
  2 sKs;t+1
io
 
 Ucs (t)
Aet
= 0
(A2)
where Ucj (t) =
h 
Cj;t + (1  ) (1  hj;t)
 1

i 
C 1j;t and Uhj (t) =
 
h 
Cj;t + (1  ) (1  hj;t)
 1

i 
(1  ) (1  hj;t) 1 for j = s; u; h. These
rst-order conditions equate the marginal benets from labour hours and in-
vestment in capital to their respective marginal costs.
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Unskilled households
Hours worked
Ucu (t)
 
1   lu;t

wu;t + Uhu (t) = 0 (A3)
Capital

n
EtUcu (t+ 1)
h 
1   ku;t+1

rt+1 +
(1 )
Aet+1
  2 uKu;t+1
io
 
 Ucu (t)
Aet
= 0
(A4)
These rst-order conditions equate the marginal benets from labour hours
and investment in capital and to their respective marginal costs. Note that
the presence of the asset holding costs,  s and  u ensures that (A2) and
(A4) di¤er in the steady-state, which is required so that the latter is uniquely
determined even if  ks = 
k
u .
Hand-to-mouth households
Hours worked
Uch (t)
 
1   lh;t

wu;t + Uhh (t) = 0 (A5)
The rst-order condition equates the marginal benet from labour hours to
its respective marginal cost.
Firms
Prot maximisation leads to the usual rst-order conditions equating mar-
ginal products of factor inputs to their prices. In particular, the FOCs of the
rm include:
MPK = rt (A6)
where
MPK = Atf
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'=
+ (1  )


hfu;t
'
g 1 ''
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'  


Kft
 1
MPLs = ws;t (A7)
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where:
MPLs = Atf
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'=
+ (1  )


hfu;t
'
g 1 ''
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'  
 (1  )

hfs;t
 1
MPLu = wu;t (A8)
where:
MPLu = Atf
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i'=
+
+ (1  )

hfu;t
'
g 1 '' (1  )

hfu;t
' 1
Note that when 1 > ' and ' > , as is the case in our calibration, MPLs
increases in Kft and h
f
u;t, while MPLu increases in K
f
t and h
f
s;t.
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Figure 1: Response of Tax Rates by Shock
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Figure 2: Response of Effective Tax Rates by Shock
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Figure 3: Tax Revenue Shares Paid by Group by Shock
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